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Abstract. Intersectionality originated as a tool for critical legal analysis. It focused on the multiplicity 
of interactions among the grounds of social exclusion, such as gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, 
national origin, (dis)ability and socioeconomic status among others, shedding light on the complexity of 
the mechanisms of power and privilege in social relations. In the last twenty-five years, intersectionality 
gained increasing popularity in the Anglophone academia, but had uneven diffusion in the different 
socio-political contexts. This article addresses its conceptual origins, providing a genealogy that connects 
intersectionality with counterhegemonic feminist theories. Intersectionality is then examined in connection 
with Critical Legal Studies within the American socio-legal context of the 70s where it has originally 
been developed as a category of legal analysis. It is argued that transposing a concept from another legal 
system into the European legal framework poses a number of challenges. This article offers an overview 
of recent developments of European Union law as an example of the advancements and challenges that the 
implementation of intersectionality in European democracy might suppose. It finally discusses the utility 
of intersectionality for legal scholarship in the context of democratic societies that aim at removing the 
formal and substantive obstacles towards the  equality of their members.
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[es] La interseccionalidad y sus viajes: de las teorías feministas contrahe- 
gemonicas al derecho de la democracia europea multinivel
Resumen. La interseccionalidad nació como herramienta para los análisis críticos del derecho. 
Permitió identificar la multiplicidad de interacciones entre las causas de exclusión social, como el 
género, orientación sexual, raza, religión, origen nacional, (dis)capacidad y estatus socioeconómico 
entre otras, arrojando luz sobre los mecanismos de poder y privilegio en las relaciones sociales. La 
interseccionalidad como concepto jurídico ha ganado popularidad creciente en la academia de habla 
anglosajona en los últimos veinticinco años y, sin embargo, ha tenido difusión desigual en los diferentes 
contextos socio-políticos. Este artículo aborda sus orígenes conceptuales, proporcionando una 
genealogía que conecta la interseccionalidad con las teorías feministas contra-hegemónicas. Relaciona 
después la interseccionalidad con los Critical Legal Studies en el contexto socio-jurídico estadounidense 
de los años 70 dónde se elaboró como categoría de análisis jurídico. Finalmente, considerando los 
desafíos que supone la trasposición en el marco jurídico de un concepto que ha viajado desde un sistema 
jurídico a otro, el articulo ofrece un recorrido del desarrollo reciente del derecho de la Unión Europea 
como ejemplo de los avances y desafíos que la implementación de la interseccionalidad en la praxis 
jurídica europea puede suponer. El artículo finalmente defiende la utilidad de la interseccionalidad para 
los estudios jurídicos en el contexto de las sociedades democráticas que tienen como objetivo eliminar 
los obstáculos formales y sustantivos para alcanzar la igualdad de sus miembros.
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1. Introduction 
This article dwells on the controversial relation among democracy, equality and dif-
ference2. Although minimalist conceptions that reduce democracy to majoritarian-
ism have been successful among political scientists (Dahl, 1957), strong arguments 
sustain that equality is foundational for the “rule of the people” (Post, 2006, 28). 
Considering democracy and equality as intimately related (Post, 2006, 34) entails 
two implications: first, democratic regimes are required to remove the causes that 
may prevent it; second, removing the causes that hamper equality implies recogniz-
ing the differences among its members. 
Although procedural theories of democracy overlooked substantive equality, 
feminist scholars showed that promoting equality of opportunities and avoiding 
marginalization is consubstantial to democracy (Pateman, 1983; MacKinnon, 1987; 
Fraser, 1990; Lister, 1998; Fineman, 2008; Phillips, 2013). They revealed that pur-
suing equality means disentangling the complex relation between equality and dif-
ference, which generates power and subordination (Gianformaggio, 2005). Feminist 
scholars thus called for inclusion as a normative ideal of democracy (Young, 2000), 
which requires equal redistribution, recognition and participation (Fraser, 1998).
Yet, globalized neoliberalism, neocolonial relations, movements of people across 
national borders and the current economic crisis added further layers of complex-
ity to the traditional challenges of accommodating equality and difference in the 
democratic arena (Benhabib, 1996). Old and new inequalities generated social gaps, 
discrimination and social exclusion based on differences, such as gender and sexual 
orientation; religion and believes; race3, skin color and ethnicity; country of origin 
and migratory status4; educational and occupational level; health, (dis)ability5 and 
2 I thank Jone Martínez Palacios for her careful reading and thoughtful suggestions.
3 The term “race” is used as a legal term to refer to a ground of discrimination. Yet, race is a problematic concept 
that erroneously conveys the idea of natural characteristics. In sociology or social anthropology, “race” has 
been replaced long ago by notions that give accounts of the processes of social construction, hierarchization and 
domination such as “racialized identity”.
4 Migration adds a significant layer of complexity because it implies a shift in social categorization. Gender roles are 
often different in the country of origin and in the host country. Also class is blurred in the migration process where 
citizenship regime, regular/irregular migration status, work conditions, level of study, religion, ethnicity and gender 
alter the conception of social class (La Barbera, 2015; Donato et al., 2006; Hennessy and Ingraham, 1997).
5 Although the most recent literature refers to the concept of functional diversity (Patston, 2007; Rodríguez Díaz 
and Ferreira, 2010), I choose to use the term “(dis)ability” not only because is the term used in EU legislation, 
jurisprudence and international conventions, but also because it allows to highlight the relational dimension of 
stigma and exclusion of the so-called “disability” on the one side and the privilege and invisible power behind 
“ability” on the other.
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age, among others. Numerous data reveal the magnitude of social inequalities in the 
European multilevel democracy. 
Recent studies show that Southern Europe has been particularly affected 
by the recent implementation of austerity policies, which threatened life sat-
isfaction, wellbeing and inclusive development (Perrons and Plomien, 2010; 
Antonucci, Hamilton and Roberts, 2014). According to the 2016 Eurostat, the 
economic crisis and austerity measures seriously affected the young population 
causing a worrying increase in youth unemployment and a large age-based eco-
nomic gap. The 2010 European Social Survey also shows that the distribution of 
domestic tasks —which has been identified long ago as one of the main causes 
of the subordination of women in the public space (Olsen, 1985; Pateman, 1988; 
Okin, 1989)— is still highly unequal in most European democratic societies. For 
this reason, austerity measures affected women in particular and increased gen-
der-based discrimination (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014; Bustelo, Alfama and 
Espinosa, 2014). Finally, the 2012 Eurobarometer indicates that ethnic discrimi-
nation continues to be perceived as the most widespread form of discrimination, 
followed by (dis)ability and sexual orientation.
Postcolonial and globalized European democracies face the pressing challenge 
to eliminate such intertwined inequalities and prevent increasingly more complex 
forms of discrimination. To deal with such a complexity, adequate concepts and 
analytical tools are needed to enable new diagnoses, political strategies and legal 
mechanisms. To this end, I refer to intersectionality as a legal concept that enables 
addressing the complexity of the situations of discrimination that underlies the de-
bate over equality and difference, and the related issues of redistribution, recognition 
and participation in European multilevel democraciy. 
Intersectionality has been defined as one of the most important contributions of 
feminist theory and praxis of the last twenty years (McCall, 2005). Since Crenshaw’s 
early formulation (Crenshaw, 1989), this concept has been developed and elaborated 
in different ways, widely transforming feminist scholarship. The intersectionality 
approach currently is at the core of gender studies, and has been converted into a 
keyword in Anglophone feminist scholarship (Davis, 2008)6. Yet, it requires further 
theoretical explorations and needs to be better known in Southern European academ-
ia where it is still underestimated. 
Following Jone Martínez Palacios, I argue that intersectionality offers novel per-
spectives to the debate on democracy because it perplexes how we understand social 
inequality and design the tools to tackle and overcome those (Martínez Palacios, 
2016, 355-356). From my own particular academic positioning at the intersection of 
disciplines such as “law and society” and “law and politics”, the aim of this article is 
to contribute to the debate on intersectionality and its legal implementation in dem-
ocratic European Union. Law is regarded here in its double component of reaction 
to injustice (case-law) and proaction to prevent it (legislation). The article is struc-
tured into three main parts i) tracing a genealogy from counterhegemonic feminist 
theories, ii) showing how intersectionality was shaped as a critical legal concept in 
6 Such popularity has a downside too, which is delinking intersectionality from black women’s subjectivities and 
radical social critique and movements that initially promoted such a perspective (Carastathis, 2013; Bilge, 2013; 
Kerner, 2016).
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the North American legal system, and iii) analyzing how a traveling concept that has 
been put at work in the legal system of the European Union. 
2. A conceptual genealogy of intersectionality from counterhegemonic feminist 
theories
The idea that subjectivities are not singular, but rather multiple and intermeshed, 
and that social sciences, movements and policies need to simultaneously address 
such a complexity is crucial in Anglophone academia today. Yet, it was not until the 
emergence of Black feminist though in the United States, that the simultaneity of 
race, gender and class, and their intersection in people’s experiences had been taken 
seriously into account (Belkhir, 2009; Carastathis, 2016). Since its origins, African 
American scholars and activists criticized the essentialism of the concept of gender, 
and exposed the need for feminist scholars to be self-reflexive, self-critical and aware 
of the their own positionality as a standpoint (Hill Collins, 1990; Haraway, 1991).
During the 80s, the Combahee River Collective ([1977] 1982), bell hooks (1981, 
1983), Angela Davis (1981), Audre Lorde (1982) and Elisabeth Spelman (1988), 
among others, claimed that the concepts of gender and race were represented as if all 
women were white and all men where black (Hull et al. 1982). In particular, gender 
was grounded on the experiences of white women and middle-class family models, 
and ignored how race, class and sexual orientation pluralize and particularize the 
meaning of being a woman. 
The Combahee River Collective appealed to the concept of interlocking systems 
of oppression to point out “the need for an integrative theory of, and a transforma-
tive praxis against, multiple oppressions” (Carastathis, 2016, 162). They addressed 
together heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism and nationalism in its attempt 
to “combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face” 
(Combahee River Collective, 1977 [1982], 13).
“Black feminist politics […] have an obvious connection to movements for 
Black Liberation […]. It was our experience and disillusionment within these 
liberation movements, as well as experience on the periphery of white male 
left, that led to the need to develop a politics that was antiracist, unlike those 
of white women, and antisexist, unlike those of Black and white men […]. We 
believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women’s 
lives as are the politics of class and race. We also find it difficult to separate 
race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often 
experienced simultaneously. We know that there is such a thing as racial-sexu-
al oppression, which is neither solely racial nor solely sexual, for example, the 
history of rape of Black women by white men as a weapon of political repres-
sion […]. We need to articulate the real class situation of persons who are not 
merely raceless, sexless workers, but for whom racial and sexual oppression 
are significant determinants in their working and economic lives” (Combahee 
River Collective [1977] 1982, 14-16). 
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African American feminists pointed out that the different social positioning of 
women, and the differences in privileges and power among them, made their experi-
ences of discrimination profoundly different. To say it with Patricia Hill Collins, “de-
pending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed 
group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed” (Hill Collins, 1990, 225).
The postmodern critique of essentialism was their fundamental analytical tool 
(hooks, 1990) to criticize the supposed neutrality of universalistic gender conceptu-
alization and argue that such a norm is in fact constructed attributing the characteris-
tics of the dominant group to all the others (Harris, 1989, 588). They denounced gen-
der essentialism as a form of reductionism that identifies gender as the fundamental 
form of exclusion of all women, minimizing all other factors of social exclusion 
(Barlett and Harris, 1998, 1007-1008). 
They denounced that to find a place in the struggles against racial and gen-
der-based discrimination, African American women have been forced to fragment 
their experiences. By isolating a single aspect of their identity and offering it as 
a meaningful whole, they had to disown all other constituent parts of themselves 
(Lorde, 1984, 120). Through this way, gender essentialism reduced multiple dis-
crimination to a problem of arithmetical sum, as if adding racism to sexism could 
explain the experiences of African American women, or adding racism to sexism and 
homophobia could give an account of the experiences of African American lesbian 
women (Spelman, 1988; Harris, 1990). African American feminists also alerted that 
the concept of patriarchy ignores how “racism ensures that black men do not have 
the same relations to patriarchal/capitalist structures as white men” (Carby, 1996, 
213) and put all men together as the enemy. 
In the attempt to offer a more inclusive conceptualization of “identity”, African 
American feminists used the notion of multiple consciousness to describe the causes 
of their exclusion and marginalization as linked to an inextricable web of social and 
institutional factors. By re-conceptualizing subjectivity as multiple and contradicto-
ry, African American feminist scholars and activists criticized mainstream theories 
of social identity that rely on self-representation and social positioning as fixed and 
immutable. They proposed to understand identity as a notion of a continuous pro-
cess of social construction in which both the social contexts and individual wills are 
involved (Harris, 1990, 584). Claiming for the need to find new analytical tools to 
address this constantly changing complexity (Hill Collins, 1990), they recalled the 
need to integrate “inter-relatedness of sex, race, and class oppression” (hooks, 1983, 
31) in conceptualizations of social justice.
In a similar venue, postcolonial studies critically assessed how the legacies of co-
lonialism, including the forms of neocolonialism and imperialism, inform and shape 
the postcolonial configuration of the world (Kerner, 2016, 9). During the 80s, post-
colonial feminists aimed at dismantling the discursive othering that placed women 
within social structures as if they were inert material. Lata Mani (1987, 130), Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (1988, 306), Leila Ahmed (1992, 15), Amede Obiora (1993, 
237) among others, challenged the notion of  universal sisterhood and claimed for 
contextual and specific alliances to achieve shared social and political goals. 
As Ofelia Schutte put it, “postcolonial studies acts as a necessary internal critical 
voice challenging both the imbalance of power existing between north and south, 
east and west and the representational practices that frame the less powerful of these 
in the discursive codes of those with the greater power” (Schutte, 2007, 167). Ac-
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cording to Chicana feminists in cultures the where, which central organizing axes of 
society are asymmetric relations based on race, class, heterosexuality and national-
ism, one can “become a woman” also in opposition to other women (Alarcón, 1990, 
356). 
By using colonization and diaspora as fundamental categories, postcolonial fem-
inists warned that the production of a particular cultural discourse on “Third World 
Women” that depicts them as poor, uneducated and backward usurped their life ex-
periences. Such a discourse constituted women as subalterns who cannot speak by 
themselves (Spivak, 1988, 287). Chandra Talpade Mohanty criticized the notion of 
“Woman” based on a transcultural concept of gender that depicts the multiplici-
ty of women’s social positioning as a coherent, homogeneous, “pre-social” group 
with common goals. Such a concept places real women out of history and social 
structures, and ignores that they are constituted instead within and through these 
very structures (Mohanty, 1988, 80). Rather than thinking about a universal sorority, 
Mohanty suggested strategic coalitions that acknowledge internal differences, power 
relations and conflicts among women. It is at the intersection of struggles against 
racism, imperialism and heteropatriarchy where we can “map the ground for femi-
nist political strategy and critical analysis” (Mohanty, 2003, 120).
At the same time, socialist and Marxist feminists aimed at redressing women’s 
oppression and exploitation by connecting feminist theory and praxis with the ma-
terial realities that shape race, gender, sexuality and nationality in relation to labor 
market and class system (Eisenstein, 1979; Delphy, 1980; Mackinnon, 1982; Hen-
nessy and Ingraham, 1997). As Ann Ferguson put it, “much of human history can 
be understood only by conceiving societies in terms of interacting but semi-autono-
mous systems of human domination, three important ones having been class, race/
ethnicity and sex/gender” (Ferguson, [1983] 1997, 40). Socialist feminists claimed 
the need for analytical tools able to explain the systemic intersection of capitalism 
and patriarchy (Eisenstein, 1979). They asserted that the Marxist vision of history 
was gender-blind and ignored women’s social production, while mainstream femi-
nist analysis was often disconnected from history and material reality (Hennessy and 
Ingraham, 1997, 7). If women’s reproductive work at home is required for the entire 
functioning of the labor market and class system, then gender must be recognized as 
a crucial component of it (Benston, 1969). Along these lines, Silvia Federici (1975) 
and Lise Vogel (1983) showed how women’s unpaid labor is required for social re-
production and has been an invisible source of profit for capitalism, while Charlotte 
Bunch (1975) drew attention to how socio-economic status is affected by the insti-
tution of heterosexuality. 
The strategy of turning to African American, postcolonial, and socialist feminist 
work to trace a genealogy of intersectionality pursues a twofold purpose. First, to 
argue that it is not an unprecedented concept but rather the result of long debates 
and discussions on the cross-culturality of gender as an analytical category and the 
dangers of essentialism. Yet, recovering back the origin does not serve the purpose 
of denying the originality of the concept. On the contrary, it is intended to empha-
size that intersectionality addresses questions that were and continue to be crucial 
for feminist scholarship and social sciences. Answering to the question whether it 
is good for feminism (Zack, 2005), I claim that intersectionality is an unavoidable 
development of counterhegemonic and marginalized feminist voices that since the 
70s questioned the mainstream perspective. In line with Patricia Hill Collins and 
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Sirma Bilge (2016), I argue not only that intersectionality does not distract from 
gender discrimination of women, but also that it allows to address the situation of the 
most vulnerable and marginalized women that have been forgotten by mainstream 
feminism. Second, to shift our attention towards the peripheral perspectives within 
feminism allows bringing them to the center (hooks, 1983). Moving towards the 
peripheries helps to recognize the coexistent and conflicting cores of feminism (La 
Barbera, 2012), and sets the machine in motion to convert it into “the very house 
of difference” where all diversity among women can find their place (Lorde, 1982, 
226). 
3. From counterhegemonic feminist theories to law 
3.1. Intersectionality as a category of critical legal analysis 
The notion of interconnectedness among gender, race and class has been thoroughly 
discussed on both sides of the Atlantic (Yuval-Davis, 2006), being differently named 
as “interlocking systems of oppression” (Combahee River Collective, 1977), “con-
substantialité des rapports sociaux” (Kergoat, 1978) “multiple jeopardy” (King, 
1988) and “matrix of oppression” (Hill Collins, 1990). Since the Columbia Law 
School professor Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” in 1989, 
this long-lived discussion was channeled and fuelled with renewed impulse, marking 
a turning point in the field. Although it cannot be found in dictionaries, it is not just 
a strange term to differently name the “holy trinity” of feminist studies (Dhamoon, 
2010, 5). Naming creates realities (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, 133). If words are 
the tools to create concepts, and concepts are the tools to analyze and shape social 
reality, intersectionality as a new terminology brought new insights for the legal 
conceptualization of social inequalities and its multiple sources. 
Kimberlé Crenshaw used intersectionality as a metaphor “to denote the various 
ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of African 
American women’s employment experiences” (Crenshaw, 1991, 1244; Crenshaw, 
2011, 230)7. She argued that, by segmenting the dimensions of discrimination, both 
feminist and anti-racist policies paradoxically ended in reinforcing the subordination 
of African American women (Crenshaw, 1991, 1252). She stated:
“I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics 
with postmodern theory. In mapping the intersections of race and gender, the con-
cept does engage dominant assumptions that race and gender are essentially sepa-
rate categories. By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a 
methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as 
exclusive or separable. While the primary intersections that I explore here are be-
7 When invited to discuss issues of gender and race discrimination in the United Nations expert group in 2000, 
Kimberlé Crenshaw affirmed: “while it is true that all women are in some way subject to the burdens of gender 
discrimination, it is also true that other factors relating to women’s social identities such as class, caste, race, 
color, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and sexual orientation are “differences that make a difference” in the 
ways in which various groups of women experience discrimination. These differential elements can create prob-
lems and vulnerabilities that are unique to particular subsets of women, or that disproportionately affect some 
women relative to others” (Crenshaw, 2000). 
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tween race and gender, the concept can and should be expanded by factoring in is-
sues such as class, sexual orientation, age, and color” (Crenshaw, 1991, 1244-45).
Intersectionality is usually represented as if the writings of African American 
feminists had been downloaded into a compressed file and automatically converted 
to run in the operating system of the law (Crenshaw, 2011, 224). Yet, understanding 
that it originated to assess specific obstacles of the US antidiscrimination law helps 
to understand its nature, its limits as well as the issues that inevitably arise when 
implementing it in other legal and institutional contexts.
Since the 60s, affirmative actions were introduced in the United States as measure 
to correct the exclusionary recruitment practices that had created an all-white and 
masculine academia. This measure allowed access to law schools and legal profes-
sions to a growing number of African Americans and women. Throughout the 70s, 
the greater presence of women and African Americans among lawyers, professors 
and legal theorists allowed to question the traditional legal categories that excluded 
both women and people of color. During the 80s, this void began to be denounced 
in legal doctrine, feminist jurisprudence and Critical Race Theory8. Intersectionality 
emerged when US antidiscrimination law was being subjected to critical re-theo-
rizing by scholars that sought to highlight the invisibility of “those who were not 
whites” and “blacks who were not men” (Crenshaw, 2011). Critical Legal Studies9 
offered the discursive tools and critical mass to structure such a project as a collec-
tive enterprise (Crenshaw, 2011, 225).
Intersectionality was thus introduced as an analytical category to comment the 
case De Graffenreid v. General Motors [1977]. The case was brought before the 
court by five African American women against their employer, claiming that the 
“last hired-first fired” dismissal system, though formulated in neutral terms, in fact 
perpetuated race and gender discrimination in violation of the federal precept of 
nondiscrimination at work. In its ruling, the Court affirmed the possibility of claim-
ing either racial or sexual discrimination, but excluded the possibility of claiming a 
combination of both. On such a premise, African American women were not recog-
nized as a special group and therefore were not allowed to use a “super-remedy” that 
combined two or more remedies beyond the intention of the statute. The court also 
established that the claimants could not be compensated because the alleged damage 
could not be identified according to existing grounds established by the statute.
According to Crenshaw, De Graffereid and the other plaintiffs who had been 
fired by General Motors were in a particularly dangerous “junction” because of their 
disadvantaged position in the gender hierarchy for being black, and in the racial 
hierarchy for being women. Using the metaphor of the traffic accident, Crenshaw 
compared the decision of the court to an ambulance that, arriving at the site of the 
8 In Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller and Kendal’s words, Critical Race Theory is “a movement of left scholars, most of 
them scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work challenges the ways in which race and racial power 
are constructed and represented in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society as a whole” 
(Crenshaw et al., 1995).
9 Critical Legal Studies is a group of North-American leftist legal scholars, among which Drucilla Cornell, Mar-
tha Fineman, Catharine MacKinnon, Mary Matsuda, Frances Olsen, Patricia Williams, Peter Gabel, Duncan 
Kennedy, Kendall Thomas, Mark Tushnet and Roberto Unger, who shed light on the ideological biases of law 
from a postmarxist and postmodern standing point (Minda, 1995; Carreras, 1999; Kennedy, 2002). They argued 
that law is politics and criticized law as a system that perpetuates social and economic inequalities.
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collision, instead of helping those injured, had left them without medical attention 
because the cause of the accident were different from those envisaged by the traffic 
code (Crenshaw, 1989). 
In her analysis of Black women’s experiences of discrimination, Crenshaw intro-
duced the idea that gender, race and class interact and jointly define the particular 
social disadvantage of African American women. Crenshaw noted that, by consider-
ing only one dimension of social exclusion at a time, anti-racist and feminist policies 
eventually excluded African American women and paradoxically reinforced their 
status of subordination and disadvantage (Crenshaw, 1991, 1252). 
“I argue that Black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theory and anti-
racist policy discourse because both are predicated on a discrete set of experiences 
that often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender. These 
problems of exclusion cannot be solved simply by including Black women within 
an already established analytical structure. Because the intersectional experience 
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take in-
tersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which Black women are subordinated. Thus, for feminist theory and antiracist 
policy discourse to embrace the experiences and concerns of Black women, the 
entire framework that has been used as a basis for translating “women’s experi-
ence” or “the Black experience” into concrete policy demands must be rethought 
and recast” (Crenshaw, 1989, 140).
In referring to the distinctive structural inequalities that shape African American 
women’s lives, Crenshaw pointed at the intersection of race and gender in three in-
terconnected levels, namely the structural, political, and representational levels. At 
the structural level, the intersectional approach serves to analyze the situation of Af-
rican American women who, being at the crossroads between different exclusionary 
social structures, suffer forms of discriminations that are different from white wom-
en and African American men (Crenshaw, 1991, 1245). To what extent racism ampli-
fies sexism and to what extent homophobia amplifies racism need to be considered 
(Matsuda, 1991). At the political level, intersectionality offers a new perspective to 
analyze how sexism, racism, homophobia and class exploitation are reproduced in 
law and policy-making processes. It implies considering, for example, to what extent 
feminist discourse can marginalize ethnic minorities or women with (dis)abilities 
(Verloo, 2006), or to what extent the instruments adopted to ensure gender equality 
can marginalize migrant women (La Barbera, 2009 and 2012). By “representational 
intersectionality” Crenshaw meant “the cultural construction of women of color” 
(Crenshaw, 1991, 1245)10. At this level, the intersectional approach allows exploring 
10 Crenshaw states that sexualized images of African Americans go all the way back to Europeans’ first engagement 
with Africans. Blacks have long been portrayed as more sexual, more earthy, more gratification-oriented. These 
sexualized images of race intersect with norms of women’s sexuality, norms that are used to distinguish good 
women from bad, the madonnas from the whores. Thus Black women are essentially prepackaged as bad women 
within cultural narratives about good women who can be raped and bad women who cannot. The discrediting 
of Black women’s claims is the consequence of a complex intersection of a gendered sexual system, one that 
constructs rules appropriate for good and bad women, and a race code that provides images defining the allegedly 
essential nature of Black women. If these sexual images form even part of the cultural imagery of Black women, 
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the discursive construction of disadvantaged subjects, considering to what extent 
popular culture and public discourse (re)produce their exclusion and marginalized 
situation (Verloo, 2006).
This perspective introduced new elements in the legal and political conceptual-
ization of the multiple axes of discrimination. Anna Carastathis (2014, 307) iden-
tifies its benefits in simultaneity, complexity, irreducibility and inclusivity. Using 
intersectionality in critical analysis of law entails approaching social positioning as a 
locus of subjetification, power and privilege, which dynamically changes over time 
and context in relation to the different structures that conform social life. Intersec-
tionality also requires to integrate activism, theory and practice (Golberg, 2009; Cho 
et al., 2013; Cruells and Ruiz, 2014), breaking the divide between academia and so-
cial work. It finally calls for the collaboration of several actors from different societal 
spheres. Adopting intersectionality as a perspective of analysis exposes the necessity 
of working simultaneously on different fronts, at distinct levels, and among various 
disciplines to promote equality and advance towards social change. It speaks about 
connection and interdependence of the axes of discrimination, and necessarily in-
volves the coalitions of actors, disciplines, and groups to reach the goal of eradicat-
ing structural inequality (Cruells and La Barbera, 2016). This is crucial for studies of 
law and democracy because it can allow to develop more comprehensive legal tools 
and political strategies of inclusion.
3.2. Intersectionality as a criterion for judicial interpretation 
In Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom a growing body of case-law 
that relies on the concept of intersectionality in judicial reasoning exists. It recog-
nizes and compensates violations of the principle of nondiscrimination occurred on 
more than one ground simultaneously. It has been recognized that “the nature of 
discrimination is such that it cannot always be sensibly compartmentalized into dis-
crete categories” (Ministry of Defence v Tilern De Bique [2010], UK). For instance, 
in the case Ministry of Defence v Tilern De Bique, the claimant, a single mother, was 
a soldier in the British army who had originally been recruited from a Caribbean is-
land. In spite of having been allowed to accommodate her work hours with childcare 
arrangements, she was later subjected to disciplinary sanctions when she was absent 
for childcare. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the Ministry of Defense’s 
appeal, ruling that:
“The nature of discrimination is such that it cannot always be sensibly compart-
mentalised into discrete categories. Whilst some complainants will raise issues 
relating to only one or other of the prohibited grounds, attempts to view others 
as raising only one form of discrimination for consideration will result in an in-
adequate understanding and assessment of the complainant’s true disadvantage. 
Discrimination is often a multi-faceted experience. The Claimant in this case 
considered that the particular disadvantage to which she was subject arose both 
then the very representation of a Black female body at least suggests certain narratives that may make Black wom-
en’s rape either less believable or less important. These narratives may explain why rapes of Black women are less 
likely to result in convictions and long prison terms than rapes of white women” (Crenshaw, 1991, 1271).
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because she was a 24/7 female soldier with a child and because she was a wom-
an of Vincentian national origin, for whom childcare assistance from a live-in 
Vincentian relative was not permitted. The Tribunal recognized that this, double 
disadvantage, reflected the factual reality of her situation” (Ministry of Defence v. 
Tilern De Bique, [2010] IRLR 471).
Judicial reasoning acknowledged long ago not only that discrimination can occur 
at the intersection of race, gender, and/or other protected grounds, but also that “cat-
egorizing such discrimination as primarily racially oriented, or primarily gender-ori-
ented, misconceives the reality of discrimination as it is experienced by individuals” 
(dissenting opinion, Canada v Mossop [1993], Canada). The argument is that “where 
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct compo-
nents […]. The attempt to bisect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and 
gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature of their experiences” (Lam v. 
Univ. of Hawaii [1994], USA). Using an intersectional perspective allows to multi-
ple discrimination it as a “whole [that] is more than the sum of its parts”, fostering 
protection to vulnerable subjects whose rights would not otherwise be guaranteed 
(AIRE Centre, 2012). 
Notwithstanding, it is important to recall that the United Kingdom, Canadá and 
the United States are common law systems. They are built on a case-by-case basis 
through the use of precedents. Judges have to “stand by the decision” (stare deci-
sis) of higher courts as binding precedents. They recognize judicially-made law as 
primary source of law. This allows to pay attention to the specific circumstances 
of each case, without fixing the content of legal principles that are rather defined 
by interpreting their meaning in relation to the facts occurred (Binder, 1996). Hav-
ing been generated as a concept in a common law context, the implementation of 
intersectionality in a different legal system brings home technical and conceptual 
problems that are often underestimated (La Barbera, 2016; Cruells and La Barbera, 
2016). 
4. Putting a travelling concept at work in the European multilevel democracy 
Contributing to the debate on the obstacles that intersectionality finds in its imple-
mentation, it is crucial to examine how it differently works in both sides of the At-
lantic. European civil law systems are fundamentally based on the codification of 
general and abstract rules. The need to a priori identify all the possible intersections 
between the grounds of discrimination makes it difficult to incorporate intersection-
ality into the legislation of European multilevel democracy. To this end, I adopt 
Ange-Marie Hancock’s (2007) distinction of unitary, multiple and intersectional ap-
proaches as a useful explanatory categorization.
The unitary approach considers only one ground of discrimination at a time, 
for example the discrimination of gender. In contrast, the multiple approach 
considers in parallel two or more axes of discrimination, for instance race and 
gender. It implies considering various sources of discriminations as cause of 
the vulnerability of disadvantaged groups. Finally, the intersectional approach 
considers the interactions between the different grounds of discrimination and 
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explores the relationships between them as an open question that is linked 
to the specific context (Hancock, 2007, 64). This categorization distinguishes 
among additive criteria, which are conveyed by the term “multiple discrimi-
nation”, and an intersectional undertaking that seek to address the interactions 
among the different grounds in shaping the specific situation of discrimination 
under consideration. 
Focusing on the supranational level, it is important to understand that EU direc-
tives have started to be drafted following a unitary approach, being each ground of 
discrimination historically addressed separately. Since the 70s, the development of 
gender equality directives has been remarkable, e.g. the Recast Directive (2006/54/
EC), Employment Equality Framework Directive (2000/78/EC), Burden of Proof 
Directive (97/80/EC), Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC)11. An overview of 
EU legislative developments illustrates a slow and gradual shift from a unitary to a 
multiple approach. 
An important advancement toward the consideration of multiple discrimination 
was reached in 2000 with the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) pursuing the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment without distinction of racial or-
igin, and the Equality Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) establishing a general 
framework for combating discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, disability, 
age and sexual orientation at work. These directives were intended to eliminate in-
equalities and promote equality between men and women, considering that women 
are especially exposed to the risk of suffering multiple discrimination. Since then, 
the multiple approach has begun to be adopted in EU law and policies addressing 
more than one dimension of inequality at once (Schiek and Lawson, 2011; Lombar-
do, 2014).
A step towards an intersectional approach can be identified in the recognition 
of multiple discriminations as structural causes of the particular vulnerability of 
specific groups. Some examples are represented by non-binding resolutions of 
the European Parliament adopted in the last five years. In particular, the resolu-
tion 2013 on women with disabilities (2013/2065/INI) recognizes that women 
with disabilities are exposed to multiple discrimination resulting from gender, 
age, religion, cultural and social inequality, stereotypes relating to disability 
that need to be addressed. Also, the 2014 resolution on violence against women 
(2013/2004/INL) states that women, due to race, ethnicity, religion or belief, 
health, marital status, housing, immigration status, age, disability, sexual ori-
entation and gender identity, may have special needs and be more vulnerable to 
multiple discrimination.
Further progress towards the adoption of an intersectional approach can be de-
tected in some of the more recent European Parliament non-binding resolutions 
where intersectionality is explicitly mentioned. For example, the 2011 resolution 
(2011/2244(INI)) on equality between women and men states that minority women, 
especially Romani women, systematically face multiple and intersectional discrim-
ination because they are disadvantaged not only compared to women belonging to 
majority groups, but also compared to men from the same minority. Likewise, the 
11 Protection against certain types of discrimination has a hegemonic role and affects the design of law and public 
policies to address other types of discrimination depending on the specific context (Ferree, 2009). This is well 
illustrated by the predominance of gender in the EU, race in the US, or social class in Germany and France.
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2013 resolution (2013/2066(INI)) on the gender dimension of inclusion strategies 
for Roma women invites Member States to take into account the multiple and inter-
sectional discrimination faced by Roma women, especially regarding employment, 
housing, health and education.
A rich scholarly production exists explaining that intersectionality challenges po-
litical and legislative strategies that segment each dimension of social exclusion, 
and seek to provide adequate responses to the complexity of social inequalities as a 
whole (Hannet, 2003; Weldon, 2006; Hancock, 2007; Bowleg, 2008; Solanke, 2009; 
Nash, 2013). Paradoxically, official documents often confuse intersectionality with 
the mere reference to more than one dimension of discrimination at the time. The 
question of course is not merely terminological. Law and public policies can tack-
le the intersections among different grounds of social inequality without using the 
term intersectionality (Cho et al., 2013). Yet, the intersections among the different 
grounds of discrimination are still largely ignored by law and policies of Europe-
an multilevel democracy (Makkonen, 2002; Uccellari, 2008; Lombardo and Verloo, 
2009; Barrère, 2010; Degener, 2011; Fredman, 2016). I argue that terminological 
issue points to the difficulty of challenging the traditional separations of grounds of 
discrimination in abstract and a priori legislation.
This tendency is replicated in the segmented interpretation of discrimination 
adopted by European courts. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and the European Court of Human Rights mainly address one ground of discrimina-
tion at time (Arnardóttir, 2009; Nielsen, 2009; Schiek and Mulder, 2011; Cruells and 
La Barbera, 2016; Fredman, 2016). The intersections among the different grounds of 
discrimination are ignored even in those few cases where more than one ground was 
taken into account (Vakulenko, 2007; Radacic, 2008; Schiek and Mulder, 2011). An 
important obstacle for the implementation of intersectionality in EU judicial praxis 
is that the list of protected grounds of discrimination approved in the Treaty and the 
Directives is considered as exhaustive. In other words, the CJEU considers that it has 
no margin to add further grounds to the listed ones (Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectiv-
idades SA [2006], §55 and 56; Coleman v Attridge Law [2008], § 46, Fag og Arbejde 
v Kommunernes Landsforening [2014], § 36 and 37). 
5. Conclusions 
Democratization processes involve questioning the exclusionary effects of law, poli-
cy and politics. The increasing complexity of postcolonial and globalized democratic 
societies makes this task especially difficult. Using intersectionality in studies of law 
and democracy enables to examine to what extent law and politics take for granted 
the privileges of the majority group, and reproduce the exclusion of disadvantaged 
people. By showing the interconnectedness and contextuality of power relations that 
shape social structures, intersectionality makes it possible advocating for social jus-
tice as a part of the wider effort to critique the status quo that negatively affects the 
most marginalized and vulnerable ones. 
Through intersectionality, legal scholarship can tailor measures on the subject 
who is located at the crossroads between different systems of discrimination. Yet, 
the analysis of the implementation of intersectionality in different democratic law 
systems highlights that specific legal institutions in different legal contexts make it 
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working differently. Intersectionality seems particularly well suited to case-by-case 
decisions that can unravel how different grounds of discrimination interact and shape 
the particular discrimination at stake. As an interpretative criterion in judicial rea-
soning, intersectionality allows to consider the mutual and simultaneous constitution 
of discriminations based on gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, national 
origin, (dis)ability and socio-economic status among others. In contrast, civil law 
systems, being mainly based on abstract and a priori rules, experience problems in 
addressing the interconnection among different grounds of discrimination that make 
people vulnerable. In the attempt to address intersectional discriminations, EU law 
ends up reproducing multiple or additive approaches that intersectionality meant to 
denounce. Further studies need to analyze the specific legal tools, norms, and praxis 
that can help law practitioners to implement intersectionality in multilevel democrat-
ic Europe. 
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